Quoting%20commentary for Bava Kamma 114:16

אלא

can it not be concluded from this that an armed malefactor is considered as a thief?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 332, n. 9. ');">²⁶</span> — I might answer: Do you presume that this statement follows the view of R. Judah who said that Hirer<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Dealt with in Ex. XXII, 14. ');">²²</span> is equal [in law] to Paid Bailee?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 330, n. 3. ');">²³</span> Perhaps it follows the view of R. Meir who said that Hirer is equal [in law] to Unpaid Bailee.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Who is exempt also where the article was stolen by an ordinary thief, in which case the thief referred to in the Baraitha did not necessarily mean a malefactor in arms but an ordinary thief. ');">²⁷</span> If you wish<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To bring the ruling into accord with R. Judah though the reason stated in n. 10 may not apply. ');">²⁸</span> I may say: [We should read the relevant views] as they were transposed by Rabbah b. Abbuha, who [taught thus]: How is the payment [for the loss of articles] regulated in the case of Hirer? R. Meir says: As in the case of Paid Bailee. R. Judah, however, says: As in the case of Unpaid Bailee.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 334, n. 8. ');">²⁹</span> R. Zera said:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That a hirer might be subject to the law of Paid Bailee, and still the Baraitha affords no support to R. Joseph. ');">³⁰</span> We are dealing here with a case where the hirer advances the plea [that it was taken by] an armed malefactor, and it was afterwards discovered that [it was taken by] a malefactor without arms.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e. an ordinary thief who has to pay double, whereas if he would have been with arms he might perhaps have been subject to the law applicable to a robber, and there would have been no place for double payment. ');">³¹</span> IF A SHEEP [ACCIDENTALLY] FELL INTO A GARDEN AND DERIVED BENEFIT [FROM THE FRUITS THERE], PAYMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT. Rab said: [This applies to benefit derived by the animal] from [the lessening of] the impact.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the fruits protected the animal from being hurt too much. ');">³²</span> But what when it consumed them? Would there be no need to pay even to the extent of the benefit? Shall we say that Rab is here following the principle laid down by him [elsewhere]? For did Rab not say, 'It should not have eaten'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra 47b. And so here the owner of the animal might plead, 'it should not have eaten'. ');">³³</span> — But what a comparison! Rab said 'It should not have eaten' only there where it was injured [by over-eating itself], so that the owner of the fruits could say [to the plaintiff], 'I will not pay as it should not have eaten [my fruits]'. But did Rab ever say this in the case where the animal did damage to others that there should be exemption?

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